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Abstract
Scientists and Bayesian statisticians often study hypotheses that
they know to be false. This creates an interpretive problem because
the Bayesian probability assigned to a hypothesis is typically inter-
preted as the probability that the hypothesis is true. I argue that
solving the interpretive problem requires coming up with a new se-
mantics for Bayesian inference. I present and contrast two solutions
to the interpretive problem, both of which involve giving a new inter-
pretation of probability. I argue that both of these new interpretations
of Bayesian inference have the same advantages that the standard in-
terpretation has, but that they have the added benefit of being ap-
plicable in a wider set of circumstances. I furthermore show that the
two new interpretations are inter-translatable and I explore the con-
ditions under which they are co-extensive with the standard Bayesian
interpretation. Finally, I argue that the solutions to the interpretive
problem support the claim that there is pervasive pragmatic encroach-
ment on whether a given Bayesian probability assignment is rational.1
1This paper is forthcoming in Philosophy of Science. Thanks to audiences at NTU,
University of Wisconsin–Madison, and the 2016 meeting for the Philosophy of Science
Association. Thanks, in particular, to Kenny Easwaran, Malcolm Forster, Elliott Sober,
Jan Sprenger, Mike Titelbaum, and the referees for Philosophy of Science.
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1 Introduction
Bayesianism is one of the most influential contemporary frameworks for sta-
tistical inference, but from a philosophical point of view Bayesian inference
faces several di culties. One particularly serious problem is that statisti-
cians who use Bayesian methods often assign non-zero probabilities over sets
of hypotheses that they know are false; yet, as I show in the next section
of the paper, this practice is inconsistent with the interpretation of prob-
ability that is standardly assumed by Bayesians. Thus there is a tension
between the standard Bayesian interpretation of probability and the way the
Bayesian framework is often applied, which I will refer to as the “interpretive
problem.”2
Although the problem is primarily interpretive and philosophical, it also
has practical consequences. According to most Bayesians, probability dis-
tributions ought to incorporate relevant background information – indeed,
the fact that Bayesians can do this in a principled way is often touted as a
major advantage that Bayesianism has over rival statistical frameworks, such
as frequentism. However, in cases where the standard Bayesian interpreta-
tion of probability fails, it’s unclear how background information should be
taken into account in a principled way. Probably in part for this reason, so-
called “default priors” that do not even attempt to take into account relevant
background information have gained prominence in recent years. But default
priors have their own problems (De Heide and Grunwald, 2018). Hence, solv-
ing the interpretive problem is not just philosophically interesting; it is also
of some practical importance.
I will argue that the only satisfactory solutions to the problem involve
reinterpreting what it means to assign a probability to a hypothesis. Accord-
2The problem has been noted in the past, e.g. by Box (1980), Bernardo and Smith
(1994), Forster and Sober (1994), Forster (1995), Key et al. (1999), Sha↵er (2001),
Sprenger (2009), Gelman and Shalizi (2013), Walker (2013), and Sprenger (2017) – indeed,
Sprenger calls the problem the “scandal of Bayesianism”– but in general the seriousness
of the issue seems to be under-appreciated.
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ing to one solution (originally proposed by Sprenger (2017)), probabilities are
interpreted counterfactually; according to a second solution, probabilities are
interpreted as what I will refer to as “verisimilitude probabilities.” Much of
the paper will be concerned with exploring the features of these two interpre-
tations. In particular, I will argue that the verisimilitude and counterfactual
interpretations have the same nice features that the standard interpretation
has, but that they have the added benefit of being sensible and useful in
situations in which the standard interpretation is not. In particular, the
verisimilitude and counterfactual interpretations of probability enable us to
incorporate background information in probability distributions in a princi-
pled manner, even when all the hypotheses under consideration are known to
be false. I will also show that the two interpretations are inter-translatable
and that they are therefore – in an intuitive sense – equivalent, and I will
explore the relationship between the verisimilitude and counterfactual inter-
pretations, on the one hand, and the standard interpretation on the other.
Although the interpretive problem arises in applied statistics, both the
verisimilitude interpretation and the counterfactual interpretation of prob-
ability are interesting from an epistemological point of view. In particular,
both interpretations have the feature that whether a given Bayesian proba-
bility distribution is rational is partly influenced by pragmatic factors. As I
argue in Section 10, there are good reasons for suspecting that all solutions
of the interpretive problem will have this feature. Thus, I argue, there is an
interesting – and unavoidable – form of pragmatic encroachment in Bayesian
inference.
2 An Abstract Characterization of the Inter-
pretive Problem
The purpose of this section is go give a brief introduction to the fundamentals
of Bayesian statistical inference and to provide an abstract characterization
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of the interpretive problem; in the next section, I show how the problem
arises in practice.
The basic objects of study in Bayesian statistical inference are statistical
models. Given a set of candidate hypotheses indexed by a parameter, ✓ in ⇥,
and given some particular context in which the possible observations or out-
comes are x1, x2, etc. in X, and given a corpus of background knowledge or
background assumptions K, a statistical model is a set of conditional proba-
bility (density) distributions,3 pK(x|✓), that jointly specify the probability of
each possible x in X given each possible ✓ in ⇥. Given a statistical model or
a set of statistical models, Bayesians do inference by following a three-step
procedure:
In the first step, a probability is assigned to each ✓ 2 ⇥; these probabilities
are supposed to be assigned before looking at the data and are therefore
known as “prior” probabilities. If there are multiple candidate statistical
models, then all of the models must be assigned prior probabilities as well.
The requirement that the numbers assigned to parameters be probabilities
rather than just arbitrary real numbers means that the assignment must
satisfy the following constraints:
Standard probability axioms Suppose ⇥ indexes a set of hy-
potheses {✓1, ✓2, . . . , ✓n} considered by some agent, and let K
represent a corpus of background knowledge. Then the distribu-
tion pK over ⇥ satisfies the probability axioms if and only if:
1S. pK(_✓i) = 1, whenever K entails that at least one
hypothesis in the disjunction of hypotheses indexed by
_✓i is true.
2S. pK(✓i)   0 for all ✓i in ⇥.
3From now on, I will for simplicity simply use “probability” although in practice prob-
ability densities are more common.
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3S. pK(
W
✓i) =
P
pK(✓i), whenever K entails that at
most one of the hypotheses in the disjunction of hy-
potheses indexed by _✓i is true.
Bayesians divide over how, exactly, pK should be interpreted. Subjec-
tive Bayesians interpret pK as the degrees of belief of some particular agent
and K as that particular agent’s background knowledge, whereas objective
Bayesians typically interpret pK as representing a logical degree of support
and K as representing a collection of “objective” background information (or
intersubjectively shared background knowledge). For our purposes, the dif-
ferences between subjective and objective Bayesians will not be important.
The more important fact, from our point of view, is that both subjective
and objective Bayesians agree that p(✓) represents a probability that the
hypothesis indexed by ✓ is true.
In the second step of Bayesian inference, data x are collected and the
“likelihood” of each hypothesis is calculated. The likelihood of ✓ is the prob-
ability that ✓ assigns to the data, pK(x|✓).
In the third and final step, the posterior probability of each parameter and
each statistical model is calculated by combining the prior and the likelihood
of each hypothesis using Bayes’s theorem, pK(✓|x) = pK(x|✓) ⇤ pK(✓)/pK(x).
In what follows, I will refer to the above three-step procedure as “standard
Bayesian inference.” Although I think each of the three steps of standard
Bayesian inference faces di culties, in this paper I will focus on the first step.
What I will refer to as the “interpretive problem” arises whenever scientists
assign non-zero probabilities to hypotheses that they know to be false. In
such situations, they will, in fact, be violating the probability axioms.
To see why, let’s suppose, for simplicity (but without loss of generality),
that the parameter ✓ can take a finite number of possible values ✓1, ✓2, . . .,
✓m. Now suppose we know that each of the hypotheses under consideration
is false, i.e. K entails that ✓i is false, for each i. Then K entails that ¬✓i
is true, for each i. 1S then implies that we must – on pain of violating the
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probability axioms – assign a probability of 1 to ¬✓i. Finally, axioms 2S and
3S jointly entail that we must must assign a probability of 0 to ✓i for every
i. Hence, if we nonetheless assign non-zero numbers to the various possible
values of ✓, we will be violating the standard probability axioms.4
In the next section, I will argue that scientists often know that all of the
hypotheses they consider are false.
3 The Interpretive Problem in Practice
Scientists are often interested in studying the functional relationship be-
tween multiple quantities. Statisticians call this type of problem “regression
analysis.” An example of a regression problem that is of obvious practical
importance5 concerns the relationship between minimal pressure and maxi-
mal windspeed in tropical storms. Let X represent the minimal pressure of
some storm and let Y represent the maximal windspeed of the storm; then
we would like to know the true functional dependence of Y on X. This rela-
tionship is unknown and probably quite complex. However, various idealized
assumptions (see Kna↵ and Zehr (2007)) justify the following model:
Y = ↵(1010 X)n + ✏ (3.1)
Here, ✏, n, and ↵ are all parameters that must be estimated from the
data.6 Each triple of values for ↵, ✏, and n picks out a given hypothesis
about the true relationship between X and Y . Importantly, the fact that the
4A referee points out that one way to undercut this argument is to insist that the
probability distribution should only be based on some proper subset of K. This is correct,
but then the question arises of which proper subpart of K it is legitimate to use. The
verisimilitude and counterfactual interpretations that I o↵er later in the paper provide
principled answers to this question.
5Discussed, for example, by Choi et al. (2016).
6Strictly speaking, ✏ itself is not a parameter; it is an error term, which in general will
have an associated parameter d that will need to be estimated. I will gloss over those
nuances here.
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model is based on idealized assumptions (i.e. assumptions that are known to
be violated in practice—indeed physically impossible) implies that the model
in fact is known to be false. That is, the true relationship between Y and X
does not belong to the class of hypotheses picked out by the parameters in
the model. Hence, every hypothesis picked out by any triple of values for ↵,
n, and ✏ is also known to be false, even before any evidence is collected.
It’s worth emphasizing that this example is by no means unrepresentative.
It is almost invariably the case in regression problems that the hypotheses
under consideration will be restricted to very simple functional relationships,
such as the set of lines, parabolas, exponentials, etc. Most functional relation-
ships in the world cannot realistically be expected to belong to one of these
sets of simple functional relationships, and indeed the choice of functional
class is usually justified on the basis of highly idealized scientific assump-
tions, if it is justified at all. Hence, scientists will generally know that all the
functional relationships they consider are false. By the argument at the end
of the preceding section, the probability axioms imply that scientists ought
to assign a probability of 0 to all of their hypotheses. But that is of course
not what they do, and for good reason because in the Bayesian framework
assigning a hypothesis a probability of 0 is tantamount to excluding it from
further consideration. If scientists were to assign a probability of 0 to all
functional relationships they know to be false, they would in e↵ect rule out
all of their hypotheses from the get-go.
Bayesian phylogenetics is an example of another major area of statistical
inference where scientists generally know that the hypotheses they consider
are false. Phylogeneticists in both biology and linguistics use trees to rep-
resent family relationships between species or between languages. In both
cases, the trees investigated omit known relationships and introduce false
idealizations (see, e.g. O’Malley et al. (2010), Heggarty et al. (2010), and
Velasco (2012)). For example, a tree phylogeny for a language family is
premised on the (false) idea that languages bifurcate instantaneously and
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are forever separated thereafter. Again, if Bayesian phylogeneticists took se-
riously the standard probability axioms, then they would have to assign all
of their hypotheses a prior probability of 0. But that is not what they do.
The widespread practice of assigning non-zero prior probabilities to hy-
potheses that are obviously false is what leads to the interpretive problem,
which may be phrased in the form of a question: what does it mean to assign
a model or hypothesis that is known to be false a non-zero probability?
4 Unsuccessful Solutions to the Interpretive
Problem
One response to the interpretive problem that initially strikes many philoso-
phers as attractive is to try to change the algebra over which the probability
function p ranges. For example, some might be tempted to consider the al-
gebra generated by the associated propositions, <✓i is the best hypothesis>,
for each ✓i, or something similar. The idea is that even if ✓i must be assigned
a probability of 0 (because it is known to be false), the standard probability
axioms allow us to assign <✓i is the best hypothesis> a non-zero probability.
However, this proposal faces several di culties. The most immediate
problem is the fact that scientists do not, in fact, consider hypotheses of
the form <✓i is the best hypothesis>. And for good reason, as we will soon
see. The problem is that whereas a parameter ✓ in a statistical model will
index a set of probability distributions each of which entails probabilities
for the various possible observations, an expression such as <✓i is the best
hypothesis> does not. For example, in the example in Section 3, ↵ = 1
picks out a particular class of hypotheses that make probabilistic predictions
about the possible observations;7 but a proposition such as <↵ = 1 is the
best hypothesis> is not part of any statistical model and does not make any
probabilistic predictions.
7In fact, each value of ↵ picks out a class of hypotheses that is itself a statistical model.
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To see the problem from a di↵erent perspective, consider Bayes’s formula:
pK(✓|x) = pK(x|✓) ⇤ pK(✓)
pK(x)
(4.1)
Clearly, the likelihood and the prior have to range over the same set
of hypotheses in order for Bayes’s formula to be applicable. If we change
the algebra of hypotheses so that we instead assign probabilities to proposi-
tions of the form <✓i is the best hypothesis>, then we may assign non-zero
prior probabilities to our hypotheses without violating the probability ax-
ioms. However, now the likelihoods will be of the form pK(x| <✓i is the best
hypothesis>), but <✓i is the best hypothesis> does not entail any proba-
bilistic prediction for x, so it’s hard to see how we are to come up with a
principled estimate for pK(x| <✓i is the best hypothesis>).8
There is another, related, reason why we cannot just change the algebra
over which the probability distribution ranges. The problem is that in replac-
ing ✓i with <✓i is the best hypothesis>, important evidential relationships
between the hypotheses and evidence will generally be lost. An important
special case is parameter estimation with exchangeable evidence,9 where a
theorem due to de Finetti10 shows that there will be a probability model
such that the parameters of the model render the evidence conditionally in-
8A similar solution has recently been proposed in the statistics literature. Walker (2013)
suggests that in cases where no hypothesis in the model indexed by ✓ is true, we ought
to construe the goal of Bayesian analysis as finding the hypothesis ✓⇤ that minimizes
statistical divergence from the true data-generating distribution (a similar proposal is
adopted by Bissiri et al. (2016)). Hence the prior distribution ranges over the possible
values of ✓⇤. There is a problem, however: the parameter ✓⇤ and the parameter ✓ range
over distinct hypotheses; ✓ ranges over hypotheses in a statistical model whereas ✓⇤ ranges
over hypotheses of the following form, where S is a statistical divergence and g is the truth:
✓⇤ = min✓2⇥ S(✓, g). Hence the likelihood, which Walker derives from the statistical
model, is of the form p(x|✓), whereas the prior is of the form p(✓⇤). But p(x|✓) and
p(✓⇤) cannot be combined using Bayes’s formula since they range over di↵erent sets of
hypotheses. To be fair, Walker (2013) is sensitive to the problem.
9Roughly speaking, evidence is exchangeable if the probability of receiving any given
sequence of evidence is not dependent on the order in which the evidence is received
10Proven in a more general form by Hewitt and Savage (1955).
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dependent. Hence, when the evidence is exchangeable, statisticians have an
imperative to construct models that render the evidence conditionally in-
dependent. But <✓i is the best hypothesis> will in general not render the
evidence conditionally independent whenever ✓i does.
As a concrete example, consider coin tossing. Coin tosses are clearly
exchangeable (e.g. “Heads, Tails, Heads” is as probable as “Heads, Heads,
Tails”), so de Finetti’s theorem implies that there exists a model with a pa-
rameter that renders the coin tosses conditionally independent. In fact, there
is a well known model that does this, namely the model that posits a param-
eter, Bias, that represents the coin’s underlying propensity to land Heads.
Each possible bias of the coin renders all future coin tosses conditionally in-
dependent.11 The coin bias model is therefore an adequate statistical model
for coin tossing in the sense that it captures the conditional independence
relations between evidence and hypotheses that de Finetti’s theorem says it’s
possible to capture. However, note that there is no reason to think that a
proposition like <Bias = 0.3 is the best value for the coin’s propensity> will
likewise render the coin tosses conditionally independent. Hence, we cannot
simply replace the Bias parameter with a di↵erent parameter without risk-
ing losing important relationships that hold between the evidence and the
hypotheses.
The same points holds more generally: statisticians (rationally) prefer
hypotheses that (1) entail probabilities for the possible evidence and (2)
have suitably informative connections with the evidence. But a proposition
such as <✓i is the best hypothesis> will generally not satisfy either (1) or
(2). And that is probably why such hypotheses do not occur in statistical
practice.
Hence, avoiding the interpretive problem by changing the algebra over
11For example,
p(Heads on second toss|Bias = 0.3&Tails on first toss) = p(Heads on second toss|Bias = 0.3).
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which p ranges is not a workable solution to the interpretive problem. Other
ways of avoiding the interpretive problem also fail to deliver. For exam-
ple, Morey et al. (2013) assert that “...scientific models, including statistical
models, are neither true nor false” (p. 71). They then recommend assigning
odds rather than probabilities to models because a “Bayesian who employs
odds is silent on whether or not she is in possession of the true model, and,
in fact, need not acknowledge the existence of a true model at all” (p. 71).
It is, however, unclear how using odds rather than probabilities is supposed
to avoid the interpretive problem. And it is not clear how refusing to assign
truth values to models avoids the problem either. What does it mean to say
that your odds are 5 to 1 in a model that is neither true nor false as against
another model that is also neither true nor false? The interpretive problem
seems to be just as severe here as before.
We have to face the interpretive problem head on, and if we are to face
interpretive problem head on, then we have to face up to the fact that it
really is an interpretive problem—the problem is that the standard proba-
bility axioms do not fit with how the Bayesian machinery is often applied
in practice. To solve the problem, it follows that we will have to come up
with a di↵erent interpretation of the Bayesian framework. For the remain-
der of the paper, I will consider two solutions to the interpretive problem.
One solution involves interpreting conditional probabilities counterfactually
rather than indicatively, while the other interpretation involves interpreting
probabilities as what I will refer to as a “verisimilitude probabilities.” As
we will see, each interpretation necessitates a new version of the probability
axioms.
5 Verisimilitude Probabilities
In cases where all the hypotheses under consideration are known to be false,
the goal of Bayesian inference cannot reasonably be construed as discovering
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the hypothesis that most probably is true. A natural proposal is that the
goal in such cases changes to discovering which hypothesis is – in some sense
– closest to the truth. Indeed, scientific realists have long held that the real
(achievable) goal of inference is closeness to the truth rather than truth itself.
The idea that the goal of inference is to identify the ✓ that is closest
to the truth leads to a natural reinterpretation of probability. Instead of
interpreting pK(✓) as the probability that ✓ is true, we interpret pK(✓) as the
probability that ✓ is closest to the truth out of the hypotheses in ⇥. I will
call this interpretation of probability the “verisimilitude interpretation.”
The reader may wonder how the verisimilitude interpretation di↵ers from
the earlier rejected suggestion of changing the algebra of hypotheses. Does
the verisimilitude interpretation not just say that we ought to assign prob-
abilities to propositions of the form <✓ is closest to the truth> rather than
to ✓ itself? The answer is no. According to the verisimilitude interpretation,
pK(✓) is a probability that is assigned to ✓ itself, not to <✓ is closest to the
truth>. Thus, according to the verisimilitude interpretation:
pK(✓) = the probability that ✓ is closest to the truth out of the
hypotheses in ⇥.
In other words, according to the the verisimilitude interpretation, a prob-
ability assignment to ✓ represents a complex epistemic attitude taken towards
✓; it does not represent a simple attitude taken towards a complex proposi-
tion.12 This is important, because as we saw in the previous section, avoiding
the interpretive problem by changing the algebra of propositions does not
work.
So far the discussion of the verisimilitude interpretation has proceeded
on an informal and intuitive level. To make the verisimilitude interpretation
precise, more needs to be said about verisimilitude. The study of verisimil-
itude was initiated by Popper (1963) and has by now accumulated a large
12Cf. the point made by Moss (2018), although the the lesson drawn here is di↵erent.
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literature.13 The most influential contemporary approach in the study of
verisimilitude – known in the literature as the “similarity approach” – un-
derstands verisimilitude as a particular kind of approximation. To say that
something is a good approximation of something else is to say that the two
things are similar in some relevant respect. Thus, to say that a hypothe-
sis is close to the truth is to say that the hypothesis is similar to the true
hypothesis.
This idea can be formalized if we suppose that there is a (context-appropriate14)
verisimilitude measure, v, that ranks hypotheses by how similar they are to
the true hypothesis. If we presume that such functions are available, we can
say that ✓1 is closer to the truth than ✓2 if and only if v(✓1) > v(✓2). Here, we
can be quite liberal in what we count as a “verisimilitude measure,” though
as a minimal requirement it is reasonable to suppose that v be maximized
by the true hypothesis, if the true hypothesis is one of the hypotheses un-
der consideration. Later in the paper I will suggest a simple verisimilitude
measure that makes sense in the earlier example concerning the relationship
between windspeed and pressure.
Given a measure of verisimilitude, v, I will use pvK with a v superscript
to indicate that the intended interpretation of pvK is the verisimilitude inter-
pretation with measure v. That is:
pvK(✓) = the probability that ✓ maximizes v.
Note that the verisimilitude interpretation is consistent with either a sub-
jective or objective Bayesian philosophy. On a subjective Bayesian reading,
13See Niiniluoto (1998) for a survey. Some of this literature has dealt with relationships
between verisimilitude and Bayesianism (e.g. Rosenkrantz (1980), Niiniluoto (1986), Ni-
iniluoto (1987), Festa (1993), Cevolani et al. (2010) and Oddie (ming)). However, no one
in the verisimilitude literature has – to my knowledge – discussed the interpretive problem
for Bayesian statistical inference.
14In general I agree with Northcott (2013) that there is little reason to assume a priori
that there will be a single distance measure that appropriately measures approximate
truth in all contexts.
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pvK(✓) would be interpreted as some particular agent’s epistemic state, K as
that agent’s background knowledge, and v as the agent’s preferred verisimil-
itude measure. On an objective reading, pvK(✓) would instead be interpreted
as expressing a logical probability, K as some objectively shared background
knowledge, and v as a verisimilitude measure that is “objectively proper”
given the purpose at hand.
Moving from the standard interpretation of probability to the verisimili-
tude interpretation necessitates a suitable change in the probability axioms.
Here is the verisimilitude version of the probability axioms:
Verisimilitude Probability Axioms Suppose ⇥ indexes a set
of hypotheses {✓1, ✓2, . . . , ✓n}, let v be a verisimilitude measure
defined over the hypotheses indexed by ⇥, and let K be a corpus
of background knowledge. Then a distribution p over ⇥ satisfies
the verisimilitude probability axioms with respect to v if and only
if:
1V. pvK(_✓i) = 1, whenever K entails that at least one
hypothesis in the disjunction of hypotheses indexed by
_✓i maximizes v.
2V. pvK(✓i)   0 for all ✓i in ⇥.
3V. pvK(
W
✓i) =
P
pvK(✓i), whenever K entails that at
most one of the hypotheses in the disjunction of hy-
potheses indexed by _✓i maximizes v.
It is clear that by adopting the verisimilitude probability axioms we avoid
the interpretive problem, because the fact that K entails that all the hy-
potheses under consideration are false does not mean that K will entail that
none of the hypotheses under consideration will be closest to the truth. On
the contrary, under commonly satisfied conditions, e.g. when the hypothesis
space is closed and bounded and v is continuous, then one of the hypotheses
will be mathematically guaranteed to maximize v.
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Note that, on the verisimilitude interpretation, the probability assigned
to a hypothesis is relative to a given way of measuring verisimilitude. Con-
sequently, in contrast to what is the case in standard Bayesian analysis, the
verisimilitude prior probability of a hypothesis does not simply reflect back-
ground information. Instead, on the verisimilitude interpretation, the prior
probability distribution is fundamentally goal-relative; its functional role in
statistical analysis is to assign less weight to hypotheses that are likely to
be further from the truth, given one’s background knowledge and given the
verisimilitude measure of interest.
6 The Verisimilitude Interpretation in Prac-
tice
The main purpose of this section is to illustrate, through an example, the
abstract remarks made at the end of the previous section. More precisely,
the goal is to show how it’s possible to combine background information
with a verisimilitude measure in a principled manner in order to derive ra-
tional constraints on verisimilitude probability distributions in a way that is
very analogous to how background information leads to rational constraints
on standard probability distributions. Thus, verisimilitude prior probability
functions can play a role in inference that is very similar to the role played
by standard prior probability functions in standard Bayesian inference. On
the other hand, the example will also serve to show how pragmatic factors
may influence what the rational constraints on the prior probability function
turn out to be, and will thereby prepare the way for the argument in Section
10.
In order to get a sense of how this will work, it is helpful to first look at
a simple example of how background knowledge can be incorporated in the
prior distribution in a simple case where there is no interpretive problem.
Suppose we are estimating the mass of a small cup of water, and suppose
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we model the outcome of the measurement as a likelihood function pK(x|m),
where x is the outcome of the measurement and m is a possible value of the
cup’s mass. The traditional frequentist (non-Bayesian) way of estimating
the value of m would be to take as our best estimate the value of m that
maximizes the probability of x—this is the maximum likelihood estimate.
From a Bayesian point of view, maximum likelihood estimation is clearly
suboptimal in this case because it fails to take into account background
knowledge that we have about the reasonable masses of cups of water.
In particular we know that m cannot be any negative value (the mass of
an object cannot be a negative number). Furthermore, we know that a small
cup of water will not weigh more than, say, 1kg. Therefore, at a minimum,
our background knowledge entails thatm lies somewhere in the interval [0, 1].
The standard probability axioms, 1S-3S, then entail that we ought to assign
every value of m that lies outside of this interval a probability of 0. From
a Bayesian point of view, this prior probability function can be expected to
improve upon maximum likelihood estimation because it restricts the anal-
ysis to an area of the parameter space that is consistent with background
knowledge. I will ague that verisimilitude probability distributions can play
a similar role in cases where we face the interpretive problem.
Consider again the example concerning the relationship between baro-
metric pressure (X) and maximum windspeed (Y ). Let’s use f to denote
the true (unknown) functional dependency of Y on X. Now, suppose one of
the things we know about the relationship between barometric pressure and
windspeed is that changes in maximum windspeed are relatively insensitive
to changes in barometric pressure, and suppose we also know the amount of
maximal windspeed associated with the minimal pressure of interest.
So far, this is background knowledge about the actual, unknown function
relating barometric pressure and windspeed. What consequences does this
background knowledge about f have for inferences about the hypothesis set
actually under consideration? To simplify the example somewhat, suppose
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Figure 1: A measure of closeness to the truth
that rather than the hypotheses in (3.1), the set of hypotheses we are consid-
ering consists of lines. Suppose, moreover, that we know that f is not a line.
Can we use our background knowledge about f to discriminate between the
various false lines in a principled way? The answer is yes, but how our back-
ground knowledge a↵ects the inferences we are entitled to make will depend
on how we measure verisimilitude.
Suppose that our ultimate goal is to build a structure that will be able
to withstand strong winds.15 In that case, it is important that the maximal
error we make when we estimate windspeed be as small as possible. In other
words, Figure 1 is a natural measure of closeness to the truth given our goal;
this is not to say that this is an appropriate way to measure closeness to the
truth given other goals.
Mathematically, the verisimilitude of some straight line L is given by
the formula vMax(L) =  Maxx2[a,b]|t(x)  L(x)|, where [a, b] is the range of
relevant pressures. Given that we use v to measure verisimilitude, and given
15I thank A for suggesting this example to me.
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that we have restricted the analysis to the class of lines, the more immediate
goal is to identify lines that are close to the truth according to v.
It is in fact easy to show that, under the given conditions, some (identifi-
able) lines will be further from the truth than others, given the way verisimil-
itude is measured and given our background knowledge—in particular, our
background knowledge entails that certain lines that have a particularly steep
slope cannot possibly be closest to the truth.16
Hence, the verisimilitude axioms, 1V-3V, entail that such lines ought to
be assigned a probability of 0.
However, crucially, if closeness to the truth is measured in a di↵erent
way, we do not necessarily get the same rational requirements on the prior
distribution. Suppose, for example, that we are instead very concerned with
the minimal rather than maximal distance of each line from the truth. That
is, we use wMin(L) =  Minx2[a,b]|t(x)  L(x)| to measure the verisimilitude
of each line (see Figure 2).
According to w, any line that intersects f will be maximally close to the
truth, and so our goal now is to identify the lines that intersect f . Clearly,
lines that have a very steep slope will stand a better chance of intersecting f
than lines that do not, and thus if we use w to measure verisimilitude, then
it is rational to use a prior distribution that assigns more probability to lines
that have a steep slope than to lines that have a more gradual slope; this
is opposite of the result we get when we use the verisimilitude measure in
16For reasons of space, I have not included a complete demonstration of this fact, but
here is a sketch: our background knowledge that changes in maximum windspeed are
relatively insensitive to variations in barometric pressure may be formalized as knowledge
that the derivative of f is bounded by some known interval, (a, b). Suppose, moreover,
that the range of relevant pressures is contained in some known interval (x1, x2), and that
we know that f(x1) = w. Then it is possible to show that if L⇤(x) = ↵x +   is a line
such that L⇤(x1) > w and ↵ > b, then there is another line L1(x) = ↵1x +  1 such that
L1(x1) < w and ↵1 2 (a, b) such that L1 is closer to the truth than L⇤, according to
the verisimilitude measure v(L) =  Maxx2(x1,x2)|f(x)   L(x)|. The upshot is that our
background knowledge entails that L⇤ cannot possibly be closest to the truth. L⇤ should
therefore be assigned a probability of 0.
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Figure 2: A di↵erent measure of closeness to the truth
Figure 1.
In general, how background knowledge interacts with a given measure
of verisimilitude in order to induce rational requirements on the prior dis-
tribution is a subtle and complex question. My goal in this section is not,
however, to demonstrate in full generality how to best translate background
information into reasonable requirements on prior distributions over sets of
known false hypotheses. My goal is rather to show how, in principle, back-
ground knowledge can be used to discriminate between multiple false hy-
potheses, provided we have a verisimilitude measure. As we have seen, the
way verisimilitude is measured plays a crucial role in shaping the rational
constraints on the prior; moreover, we have also seen that the way verisimil-
itude ought to be measured is reasonably influenced by the goals that we
have.
It is worth emphasizing, once again, that regardless of how verisimili-
tude is measured, the prior probability distribution ranges over exactly the
same set of hypotheses—in this case, the set of lines. The set of hypotheses
does not change when we change the verisimilitude measure; rather, on the
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verisimilitude interpretation, it is the probability function pvK that changes.
According to standard Bayesianism, the probability one should assign to any
particular hypothesis is independent of one’s goals, but this is no longer true
for verisimilitude probabilities. Instead, the verisimilitude probability that it
is rational to assign to a hypothesis is in part influenced by how verisimilitude
is measured.
7 The Counterfactual Interpretation of Prob-
ability
The verisimilitude interpretation has the feature that the prior probability
distribution incorporates not just background information, but also what one
hopes to accomplish, formalized by way of a verisimilitude measure. Con-
sequently, the verisimilitude probability that it is rational to assign to a
hypothesis will be influenced by how verisimilitude is measured, which in
turn will generally be influenced by pragmatic factors. In a very recent pa-
per, Jan Sprenger (2017) proposes an alternative solution the interpretive
problem. Sprenger’s solution also involves reinterpreting the probability ax-
ioms, but he o↵ers a reinterpretation that appears to be quite di↵erent from
the verisimilitude interpretation. However, as we will soon see, given certain
plausible assumptions, the verisimilitude solution and Sprenger’s solution
share many features in common and are even formally inter-translatable.
Sprenger’s suggestion is that the probability of a false hypothesis can
sensibly be interpreted as a counterfactual probability (or, more specifically,
a counterfactual degree of belief. However, the counterfactual interpretation,
like the verisimilitude interpretation, is consistent with either an objective
or subjective reading). More precisely, suppose ⇥ is a set of hypotheses,
all of which are known to be false. Then any probability assigned to some
particular ✓i should be construed as the probability that ✓i is true conditional
on the (false) supposition that one of the hypotheses in ⇥ is true. In other
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words, the probability of ✓i is really the counterfactual conditional probability
pK(✓i|⇥), where the condition ⇥ is construed as the (false) claim that one of
the hypotheses in ⇥ is true.
Note that pK(✓i|⇥) cannot simply be replaced with pK(⇥ ! ✓i), i.e.
with a probability distribution defined over counterfactual propositions—the
discussion on p. 9 applies equally here. ✓i picks out a hypothesis in a scientific
and statistical model that makes probabilistic predictions, but ⇥ ! ✓i does
not.17
In order for the counterfactual interpretation to be a rigorous alterna-
tive semantics for Bayesian inference, something more substantive needs to
be said about how we are supposed to understand and evaluate counterfac-
tual probabilities. Unfortunately, Sprenger does not o↵er us any guidance.
However, a natural thought is that counterfactual probabilities should be
evaluated in a way that is analogous to the way counterfactual conditionals
are evaluated. According to (a simplified version of) the standard analysis of
counterfactuals due to Lewis (1973), evaluating a counterfactual such as “If
A were the case, then B would be the case,” involves considering the closest
possible world in which A is true, and then checking whether B is true in that
world. Crucially, Lewis’s analysis depends on a ranking of possible worlds,
where worlds are ranked by how similar they are to the actual world.
Presumably counterfactual probabilities should be assessed in a similar
manner. It is not hard to imagine very strange and fanciful possible worlds
in which pressure and windspeed are linearly related, but presumably most
of those possible worlds are not interesting or relevant. As is the case in the
counterfactual analysis of conditionals, it is presumably the closest possible
worlds that are the interesting ones. But which possible worlds are those?
To answer this question, we need to be able to rank worlds in terms of their
closeness or similarity to the actual world. Suppose we have such a similarity
17In addition, replacing pK(✓i|⇥) with pK(⇥ ! ✓i) might run us into triviality result
problems.
measure, s. Then we can define the counterfactual probability of ✓i given s,
psK(✓i|⇥), where psK must obey the following constraints:
Counterfactual probability axioms Suppose ⇥ indexes a set
of hypotheses {✓1, ✓2, . . . , ✓n}, let s be a similarity measure de-
fined over the set of possible worlds, and let K represent a corpus
of background knowledge. Then a distribution p over ⇥ satisfies
the probability axioms with respect to s if and only if:
1V. psK(_✓i|⇥) = 1, whenever K entails that one of the
hypotheses in the disjunction _✓i is true in the closest
world (according to s) in which ⇥ is true.
2V. psK(✓i|⇥)   0 for all ✓i in ⇥.
3V. psK(
W
✓i|⇥) =
P
pvK(✓i|⇥), wheneverK entails that
at most one of the hypotheses in the disjunction of
hypotheses indexed by _✓i is true in the closest world
(according to s) in which ⇥ is true.
The counterfactual interpretation, like the verisimilitude interpretation,
solves the interpretive problem, because the fact that K entails that ✓i is
false does not mean that K entails that ✓i is false in the closest possible
world in which ⇥ is true. Hence, the counterfactual interpretation allows us
to assign non-zero probabilities to hypotheses that we know are false (in the
actual world).
It’s clear that the counterfactual interpretation has the same broad fea-
tures as the verisimilitude interpretation. In particular, on the counterfactual
interpretation understood in the above Lewisian way, every probability as-
signment becomes relative to the way similarity between worlds is measured.
Moreover, there are many ways of measuring similarity between worlds, but
the way in which similarity between worlds should be measured is presum-
ably relative to the features of the world that are relevant, and what features
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are relevant is in part determined by the goals of the analysis. Indeed, in
the next section we will see that the counterfactual and verisimilitude frame-
works are plausibly inter-translatable, so that if verisimilitude probabilities
are goal-relative, then so are counterfactual probabilities.
8 Relationship Between the Verisimilitude and
Counterfactual Interpretations
At this point, we apparently have two viable reinterpretations of the Bayesian
framework, both of which solve the interpretive problem. Many philosophers
will be tempted to ask which of the two solutions is the better one. My
contention is that neither solution is better than the other, and that in fact
there is a sense in which the two solutions are equivalent.
Indeed, note that, in general, any similarity ranking of possible worlds
straightforwardly induces a natural verisimilitude ranking of hypotheses, and
vice versa. More precisely, suppose we are given a similarity ranking function,
s, on worlds such that s(w↵)   s(w1)   s(w2)   . . ., where w↵ is the actual
world. Then we can define a verisimilitude ranking on hypotheses as follows:
suppose w is the closest world in which H is true and w0 is the closest world
in which H 0 is true, then v(H)   v(H 0) if and only if s(w)   s(w0).18
Conversely, any verisimilitude ranking induces an ordering over possible
worlds. Suppose v(H0)   v(H1)   v(H2)   . . . is a verisimilitude ranking
of hypotheses, and for any hypothesis H, let SH denote the set of worlds in
which H is true. Then we can define an ordering of possible worlds in the
following way: suppose H is the hypothesis with the highest verisimilitude
such that that w 2 SH and suppose H 0 is the hypothesis with the highest
verisimilitude such that w0 2 S 0H , then we define s such that s(w)   s(w0) if
and only if v(H)   v(H)0.
18Hilpinen (1976) uses a similar approach to define a specific verisimilitude measure.
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According to the verisimilitude interpretation, agents have to evaluate
which hypothesis is plausibly closest to the truth out of the hypotheses under
consideration. According to the counterfactual interpretation, agents must
instead evaluate which hypothesis is plausibly true in the closest possible
world in which one of the hypotheses under consideration is true—in other
words, they must evaluate what the closest possible world is plausibly like.
Since any verisimilitude ranking may be translated into a ranking of worlds,
and vice versa, it’s now clear that these two tasks are really one and the same.
That is, if s is the similarity ranking that is induced by the verisimilitude
ranking v, then a hypothesis, H, will be closest to the truth according to v
if and only if H is also true in the world that is closest to the actual world,
according to s. Figuring out how probable it is that H is closest to the truth
according to v is therefore equivalent to figuring out how probable it is that
H is true in the closest possible world according to s.
None of the above should really be that surprising since a similar fact
is true of standard Bayesianism. There is a well known duality between
propositions and possible worlds: a proposition may be construed as a set
of possible worlds, and a possible world may be construed as a conjunction
of propositions. Hence, an agent who has a degree of belief in a certain
proposition may be regarded as implicitly having a degree of belief that
the actual world is in a certain set of possible worlds, and vice versa. The
correspondence between verisimilitude rankings and possible worlds rankings
shown in this section demonstrates that the same is true of counterfactual and
verisimilitude probabilities: any counterfactual probability may be regarded
as an implicit verisimilitude probability, and vice versa.
Thus, although they may appear di↵erent, the verisimilitude interpreta-
tion and the counterfactual interpretation of probability are, in a sense, two
sides of the same coin. This means that if there is pragmatic encroachment in
the verisimilitude framework, there will also be pragmatic encroachment in
the counterfactual framework. In particular, if the reader agrees that the ex-
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ample in Section 6 plausibly shows that verisimilitude rankings are sometimes
goal-relative, then the same example will also show that rankings of worlds
are sometimes goal-relative, since the verisimilitude ranking may simply be
translated into a ranking of possible worlds using the recipe provided in this
section. It follows that the rational status of counterfactual probabilities will
in general be goal-relative.
9 Relationship Between the Verisimilitude,
Counterfactual, and Standard Interpreta-
tions
The preceding section investigated how the counterfactual and verisimilitude
interpretations of probability relate to each other. But how do either of these
interpretations relate to the standard interpretation? Recall that cccording to
the standard interpretation, pK(H) is the probability that H is true, relative
to background knowledge K. Ideally, the verisimilitude and counterfactual
interpretations should both be generalizations of the standard interpretation,
so that both are extensionally equivalent to the standard interpretation in
cases where the standard interpretation is applicable; i.e. in cases where K
entails that one of the hypotheses under consideration is true. Is that the
case?19
The answer is that it depends on characteristics of the verisimilitude and
counterfactual similarity measures. Let’s first consider the verisimilitude in-
terpretation. Let’s call the true – but unknown – hypothesis t. Suppose v is
such that it has a unique maximum over the set of hypotheses under consid-
eration, and that the unique maximum is t. According to the verisimilitude
interpretation, pvK(H) is the probability that H is a maximum of v, relative
to K, which, under the conditions specified, means that pvK(H) is the prob-
19I thank C for pressing me on this issue.
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ability that H = Ht (since Ht is the only maximum of v); in other words,
pvK(H) is simply the probability that H is true, relative to K. Thus we have
pvK(H) = pK(H). Hence, the verisimilitude interpretation is extensionally
equivalent to the standard interpretation under the specified conditions in
the sense that the the verisimilitude and standard probability distributions
assign the same probabilities to all hypotheses. However, if v has several
maxima or if the truth is not among the maxima of v, then clearly pv(H)
will not necessarily equal pK(H). Hence, the verisimilitude interpretation
is extensionally equivalent to the standard interpretation just in case the
following conditions are met: (1) v has a unique maximum over the set of
hypotheses, (2) that unique maximum is the truth.
Now let’s consider the counterfactual interpretation of probability. Sup-
pose the similarity ranking over possible worlds satisfies the following con-
ditions: (1) there is a unique world that is closest to the actual world, (2)
the actual world is closest to itself. Then, by essentially the same reason-
ing as above, it follows that we will have psK(H) = pK(H). Hence, the
counterfactual interpretation is extensionally equivalent to the standard in-
terpretation just in case one of the hypotheses under consideration is true
and the similarity ranking over possible worlds satisfies the constraint known
in the counterfactuals literature as strong centering.
10 Pragmatic Encroachment in Bayesian in-
ference
I have argued that the only adequate solutions to the interpretive prob-
lem in Bayesian statistical inference involve reinterpreting probability, and I
have proposed two candidate reinterpretations. Both the counterfactual and
verisimilitude interpretation have the following two important features: (1)
they both depend on a ranking over some sort of object (either hypotheses
or possible worlds), (2) the ranking that it is rational for an agent to have
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is influenced by pragmatic factors, such as what the agent’s goals are. The
upshot is that whether a given probability assignment (i.e. verisimilitude or
counterfactual probability) is rational is influenced by pragmatic factors.
Of course, the standard Bayesian interpretation also allows for pragmatic
factors to play a role. According to standard Bayesian decision theory, we
ought to have both a probability function and a utility function; any prag-
matic factor – such as what we are interested in – should be relegated to
the utility function. This neat separation between the purely epistemic and
the pragmatic fails in cases where we face the interpretive problem. In those
cases, I have argued that pragmatic factors should directly influence the
probability function, not just the utility function.
The reader may wonder whether there are other potential solutions to
the interpretive problem that would avoid having features (1) and (2). In
Section 4, I argued that any solution to the interpretive problem needs to
o↵er a reinterpretation of the probability axioms. A moment’s reflection
should make it clear that any re-interpretation that allows us to assign a
non-zero probability to a known false hypothesis needs to involve a ranking
of some sort: if H1 and H2 are both known to be false, and yet we assign a
higher probability to H1 than to H2, there must be some sense in which H1 is
“better” thanH2. The remaining question, then, is whether there is a ranking
of hypotheses (or other objects—of course, any ranking must implicitly be
a ranking of the hypotheses, since we are ultimately assigning probabilities
to the hypotheses) that can plausibly count as “objectively correct.” Here,
thinking about concrete examples – such as the example in Section 6 – should
convince us that the answer is “no.” Anyone who disagrees will have to
explain why, say, the way you rank various lines in the example in Section
6 should be independent of your interests. Hence, my conjecture is that all
adequate solutions to the interpretive problem will have features (1) and (2).
By combining the above considerations with a reasonable bridge premise,
the following argument may now be formulated:
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P1: All satisfactory solutions to the interpretive problem involve
reinterpreting what it means to assign a probability to a hypoth-
esis.
P2: Any satisfactory reinterpretation that solves the interpretive
problem will have the following two features: (1) it will depend
on a ranking over some sort of object, (2) whether a given ranking
is rational will in part be determined by pragmatic factors.
P3: If P1 and P2, then whether a given Bayesian probability
distribution is rational will, in general, partly be determined by
pragmatic factors.
C: Whether a given Bayesian probability distribution is rational
will, in general, partly be determined by pragmatic factors.
The upshot of this argument is that there is an important – and hitherto
unnoticed – kind of pragmatic encroachment on Bayesian inference.
In recent years, there has been much debate over whether there is some-
times “pragmatic encroachment” on the epistemic, i.e. whether pragmatic
factors can sometimes influence whether an agent, for instance, knows whether
a proposition is true.20 As Mark Schroeder (2017) point outs, it seems to be
almost universally agreed among participants of this debate that although
there may be pragmatic encroachment on knowledge or rational (full) be-
lief, there is no pragmatic encroachment on Bayesian probability functions.
Prominent experts on Bayesian statistical theory agree, including adherents
of the subjective (Lindley, 1972, p. 71) and objective (Jaynes, 2003, p. 19)
schools of Bayesianism. However, despite this theoretical consensus, in prac-
tice Bayesian statisticians tend to use di↵erent prior probability distributions
20See e.g. Stanley (2005), Fantl and McGrath (2002), Ross and Schroeder (2014), Rubin
(2015), or Roeber (2016)
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depending on what they are interested in.21 The arguments in this paper par-
tially undermine the theoretical consensus and lend a justification of statisti-
cal practice. Whereas it may be true that there is no pragmatic encroachment
on standard Bayesian probability functions, there is – and ought to be – sig-
nificant pragmatic encroachment on both counterfactual and verisimilitude
probabilities, and those are the types of probability distributions that are
frequently (implicitly) used in statistical practice.
11 Conclusion
This paper has mainly been concerned with the implications of the inter-
pretive problem for our interpretation of the prior probability distributions
that are used in Bayesian statistical practice. I have not said anything about
the likelihood, but in fact the interpretive problem arguably has even greater
implications for how we are to interpret, and use, the likelihood function and
associated principles such as the Law of Likelihood and Conditionalization.
In particular, although I will not argue this here, the counterfactual and
verisimilitude interpretations open the door to the possibility that it may
sometimes be rational to use an evidential measure other than the likelihood
and an updating procedure other than Conditionalization. This is because
the standard arguments for Conditionalization turn out to depend crucially
on the standard interpretation of probability. Thus, although this paper has
been concerned with showing that we sometimes need to change the stan-
dard Bayesian semantics, once we have a new semantics, it becomes apparent
that we may sometimes be justified in also changing the standard Bayesian
syntax.
21I thank a referee for pointing this out.
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